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Abstract
The upcoming privatization of two remaining telecom operators in Bosnia, and not so recent privatization of one of the 
incumbent, will create dynamic and changing sector environment for all participants. At the same time the investors are scanning 
the sector trying to find the right approach and the market niche for more competitive start. In our overview we have looked at 
regulatory status, core services figures, followed by financial overview for incumbent operators in the past decade, as well as 
mobile users' attitudes in carrier section. What we will show is that sector development and the expansion of consumers' base is 
far from over. The services offered are still at rudimental level, and the potential owners of incumbent operators as well as new 
entrants will have considerable room for development. Financial analysis has shown that revenue for all three incumbent 
operators is stagnating in the last years, while the small private operators are experiencing steady growth. Although BH Telecom 
is still the largest company in the sector, it dose face slight decline in net profit while its biggest competitor – Telecom Srpske in 
2013 had biggest ROE. We find that BH Telecom and Telecom Srpske had unexploited franchise growth and competiveness 
potential. We assessed the intrinsic value of all three companies stocks by application of Franchise Factor Model and find that 
BH Telecom stock price is in equilibrium, Telecom Srpske stock is underpriced and Croatian Telecom is stock strongly 
overpriced. Finally, the analyses of consumers' perspective have revealed existence of network effect in mobile market and the 
strong competition between two market leaders. In all, BiH telecommunication sector is still in its expanding phase and the 
potential owners of state operators as well as new entrants will have competitive well regulated market.
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1. Introduction
As telecommunications have become an essential part of how economies work and function, the telecommunications 
sector is unprecedented source of opportunities for economic growth in developing and emerging markets. In recent 
years, through boom in mobile data services as well as liberalization of telecommunication services, we have witnessed 
increased consumer expectations and additional pressures on telecom operators to provide wide range of services at 
diminishing prices. By focusing on developing countries, a series of studies have found a link between 
telecommunication sector development and the overall economic growth (Das & Srinivasan, 1999; Waverman et al.,
2005; Thompson & Garbacz 2007; Biancini, 2011; Narayana, 2011; Bacchiocchi et al., 2011; etc). With the intention to 
serve as comprehensive outlook at the key elements of telecommunication sector in Bosnia and to some extent by 
anticipating dramatic change in sector structure and dynamics with the upcoming privatization of the largest operator in 
the sector, this paper provides a snapshot of sector structure and regulation. As the first visible effects of recently 
privatized Telecom Srpske (rebranded to: "M:tel") are showing, we will provide telecommunication sector outlook over 
the past decade covering core service figures, key financial indicators, as well as current status of sector regulatory 
framework. Furthermore, for more insightful look at the sector we also included a brief look at the result of consumers' 
perceptions and attitudes in mobile service provision survey.
2. Literature Review
The role of telecommunication sector in the development has been extensively analyzes over the past decades. In 
our literature review we found a number of studies focused on diverse and rather different issues related to the 
impact of telecom operators and/or services on the economic growth. Hardy (1980), followed by Saunders et al. 
(1983) and Leff (1984), represents the early attempts to assess the relationship between telecommunication service 
and economic growth. Although models were not as sophisticated as we would expect today, they do support 
positive impact of telecommunications on economic development. Madden and Savage (1998) where the first to 
measure the impact of telecommunication infrastructure investments on economic growth, and found it has an 
important role in overall country development. In particular they tested causality between investments and GDP 
growth and found that although causality is generally in both directions, telecom penetration rates precede more 
directly economic growth than do telecom investments. Röller and Waverman (2001) questioned feedback process 
between activity in telecommunications and aggregate economy. Conclusion was that, for OECD countries, 
telecommunications infrastructure growth has a positive effect on economic growth, especially when having in mind 
that most of OECD countries, for the researched period (1970-1990), had state-owned telecommunications 
enterprises. Using their model, Jacobsen (2003) re-questioned conclusions with larger country sample, including 
some of developing countries. His findings show that the threshold effect is not statistically significant and that there 
is a correlation between telecommunication and GDP growth for both developed and developing countries. Focusing 
on developed countries, Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001) included 23 OECD countries and showed that effective 
competition reduces the prices of all telecommunication services, while Edwards and Waverman (2006) study of 15 
European countries and found that public ownership increases interconnection prices while regulator’s independence 
decreases it. On the other hand, Grzibowski (2005) used sample data for EU countries from 1998-2002 and showed 
that the liberalization of landline has a negative impact on the prices of mobile services and a positive effect on the 
demand.  Author concludes that the effects of liberalization are not just restrictive for landline, but also contribute to 
positive developments in the mobile industry. Also, competition enhancing measures like the introduction of number 
portability decreases consumer switching costs and in turn causes prices to fall. 
With more emphasize on developing countries, Li and Xu (2004) use a sample of 177 countries (ITU and WB data) 
over ten year period to estimate the impact of privatization and competition on telecommunication sector. The authors 
find positive effects of privatization on output/growth, productivity and resource allocation. However, the finding also 
shows increase in output and prices of local calls as a result of privatization. Although, the privatization has led to 
increase in service quality, strong network externalities, in combination with non-competitive behavior, leads to 
increase of cost of phone calls.  El Khoury and Savvides (2006) study looks the effects of privatization, deregulation 
and competition in the telecom sector as the determinants of economic growth. The findings for 23 less developed 
countries do support conclusion that telecom openness has positive impact on economic growth. Thompson and 
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Garbacz (2007) look at 93 countries estimating impact of telecom variables on economic growth in countries. The 
authors firmly acknowledge evidence that expanding telecommunications penetration has a positive effect on economic 
development, but also point out the reduction in inefficiency due to an increase in penetration of landline/mobile or 
internet services. In more recent study, Gasmi and Virto (2010) conducted an econometric analysis of 1985-1999
databases on 86 developing countries in the form of a time-series-cross-section database and found positive impact of 
privatization on landline deployment in developing countries with no effect on developed economies. Finally, Biancini 
(2011) estimates the determinants of demand and the diffusion process of fixed telecom services in India, using the 
state level data from 1999–2004. She estimated the determinants of supply of telecommunications by treating the level 
of investment as a dependent variable. The estimation results show that competition stimulates investment in the most 
developed areas, at the same time it does not seem to have a significant impact in the less developed ones. Biancini 
(2011) concludes that for stimulating investment in less developed areas some direct intervention seems to be 
necessary: a true competition for the market and an efficient subsidization policy could be a response to this problem. 
Furthermore, attributing the dramatic changes in demand for telecommunication services only to intense price 
competition often results in misaligned competitiveness strategies. By focusing only on drop in end-user prices of 
practically all telecommunication services, and by ignoring issues of regulation, regulatory authorities' setup, 
consumers' preference or role of network effects, the overall approach to consumers will be amiss (Zaimovic, 2012). 
Network effects, especially present in telecommunications and information industries, play a key role in sector 
overall mechanics. As they are a type of externality whereas the products or services become more valuable with the 
greater number of people who use the same or compatible technology, product or service – each new network user 
adds potential value through exchange with other network members (Economides, 1996, Birke, 2009). Since the 
number of network users is assumed to reflect long-term market stability (Katz & Shapiro 1994), consumers should 
generally prefer firms with larger installed bases (Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Suarez 2005; Chun & Hahn, 2007; 
Strader et al., 2007). Consequently, it can be especially difficult for newcomers to unseat an established rival in 
markets where the influence of network externalities is strong. Moreover, given the value consumers place on 
installed base and market dominance, feature-richness and quality may lose in importance – with the result that the 
“best” product or service does not always win (Birke & Swann, 2010; Sobolewski & Czajkowsi, 2012). 
All above mentioned is further perplexed by governments'' misunderstanding of different and often conflicting 
issues related to privatization of state owned telecommunication operators resulting in partial and(or) uneven service 
development (mobile or Internet vs. landline), week overall social welfare effects, additional strengthening of 
incumbent operators monopoly position, as well as moderate sector development.
3. Regulatory framework
After the war in Bosnia the country remained highly segregated along ethnic lines, where the three main ethnic 
groups have substantial autonomy and control over their own ethno-territorial units. These ethnic divisions created 
during the war period have largely been institutionalized by the constitution, influencing the telecommunication 
market/sector as well. Accordingly, the three telecommunications operators were initially organized following ethnic 
lines established during the war. With the establishment of independent state-level Communications Regulatory 
Agency (henceforth, CRA) in 2001 we have seen dramatic changes in both license arrangement as well as overall 
sector development. The telecommunications sector is regulated by the Law on Communications of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina adopted in 2002, but also trough Government defined Sector Polices and CRA Rules and Decisions. 
From 2000 to date, the Council of Ministers adopted four telecommunication Sector Policies. The 2000, 2002 and 
2006 policies were mostly focused on liberalization of existing services and licensing arrangements. The fourth and 
currently valid policy, adopted in 2009 is concentrated at finalizing and securing full competition in the 
telecommunications sector through continuation of regulated interconnection offers and further defining conditions 
for local loop unbundling. Since 2002, with 73 Rules and 26 individual Decisions relating to the telecommunications 
sector and despite the ever-present political difficulties, CRA has managed to regulate telecommunication sectors.
Today, licensing arrangements are established; interconnection referent offers are common particle; LLU has 
been implemented; number portability is available; UTMS network is up and running, EU monitoring mechanics 
have been established and ex-ante price regulation is slowly fading out, and in 2013 the wholesale of services and 
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virtual mobile operators were introduced. By following the frameworks set out by the Sector polices the CRA has 
gradually liberalized and regulated the telecom sector, and despite the unusual level of regulator's independence set 
by the Law, the severe sanction and aggressive regulatory measures did not take place – often to detriment of end-
users and the small operators. 
4. Core service figures
Currently, there are more than 100 companies that provide some form of telecom services. According the Law the 
CRA identified three operators with significant market power: BH Telecom, Telecom Srpske (henceforth, Mtel) and 
Croatian Telecom. In following analysis will focus primarily on incumbent operators. Table below provides core 
service figures and overall number of Internet users.
Table1. Core service figures 2001-2014 (source: compiled and processed by the authors) 1
Year
BH Telecom Telecom Srpske Croatian telecom Small operators Total 
landline
Total 
mobile
Internet 
usersLandline Mobile Landline Mobile Landline Mobile LL. Mob.
2001 452.778 - 274.474 - 119.774 - - - 849.027 - -
2002 484.996 - 290.087 - 127.753 - - - 904.838 - -
2003 509.094 521.050 298.922 387.811 128.000 - - - 938.019 908.861 -
2004 518.550 715.735 303.435 493.706 129.541 198.000 - - 951.526 1.407.441 585.000
2005 538.242 817.259 304.463 558.329 126.152 218.779 - - 968.857 1.594.367 805.185
2006 531.273 927.284 323.816 638.983 130.392 321.549 - - 985.481 1.887.816 950.000
2007 568.670 1.069.284 328.868 880.337 124.937 500.804 - - 1.022.475 2.450.425 1.055.000
2008 524.814 1.426.790 329.634 1.109.686 126.663 624.560 - - 981.111 3.161.036 1.307.585
2009 507.318 1.251.467 313.462 1.231.489 126.846 709.108 - - 947.626 3.192.064 1.421.540
2010 502.376 1.306.251 360.102 1.344.006 127.202 363.443 - - 991.690 3.013.700 2.000.000
2011 480.903 1.361.548 337.991 1.377.769 124.462 431.699 12.581 - 957.948 3.171.283 2.113.100
2012 458.721 1.493.205 322.581 1.411.169 121.888 447.957 26.263 - 931.465 3.352.331 2.174.250 
2013 423.429 1.547.571 308.270 1.466.742 114.785 464.601 45.138 9.405 893.635 3.488.319 2.188.429
2014 379.214 1.639.214 295.680 1.382.338 108.864 460.007 65.458 9.631 849.216 3.491.188 2.227.970
At the end of 2014, beside three incumbent operators, there are 13 small operators with a license to provide 
service of public fixed operator. Although alternative operators are doubling their number of users every year, the 
total share of small operators in provision of landline telephony services is still below 10%. It is interesting to notice 
that the total number of landline users is showing global trend of decrease (Grzibowski, 2005), and after 15 years the 
number of subscribers is as it was in 2001. 
Licensing arrangement considers BH Telecom, Mtel and Croatian Telecom as three incumbent operators in 
segment of mobile telephony. The license covers following spectrum: GSM 2.0, 2.5/GPRS i 3G/UMTS. By looking 
at the nominal parameters, we see steady rise in overall subscriptions, with ratio significantly in favor of pre-paid 
users. As a result of Telecom Srpske privatization we can observe slight decrease of mobile users in 2009 for BH 
Telecom and the fall in numbers is almost identical to the growth in number of users of other two operators. The 
privatization of Telecom Srpske in 2007 led to positive growth in the number of users, and this continued till 2009 
when Mtel reported highest growth. Mobile telephony penetration for 2014 was 90.8%, while the mobile network 
coverage in on the level of 99% in accordance with the parameters of the GSM license. In addition, in 2009 the 
CRA approved 3G/UMTS licenses to existing GSM operators and in 2014 coverage with 3G service was 92.4%. 
According to the data from CRA in 2005 42 Internet service providers operated while in 2014 this number rose to 
70. Broadband represents 99.6% of all Internet connections, while the remaining 0.4% uses dial-up access (via 
analogue modem and ISDN). In the structure of broadband connections DSL access still leads with 57.14%. This 
trend is followed with the rise of cable Internet access and FWA connections. Based on International 
1 CRA, Telecommunication indicators of B&H.
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Telecommunication Union guidelines, The CRA estimated that Internet penetration level in BH is 65%, while the 
European average is 67%. Smartphone penetration is also slightly below European average with 19%.
Additional services, offered by both incumbent and alternative operators, are mainly focused on "bundling" of 
services, but also include subscriber management, device management, service management, mobile payment, third 
party service/content provision, electronic payments, mCommerce, mParking, etc.
5. Sector financial outlook
Ownership structure, among incumbent telecom operators, is currently uneven and cannot be generalized.  Two 
of three incumbent telecom operators are partially privatized. JSC BH Telecom Sarajevo is still mostly state owned, 
with private share of 10.00%, while JSC Hrvatske telekomunikacije Mostar (Croatian Telecom) has state ownership 
just above 50% and private ownership in percentage of 49.90% (JSC Hrvatske Telekomunikacije Zagreb/Croatia 
owns 39.10% ordinary shares). JSC Telekom Srpske Banja Luka is privatized with following ownership structure: 
JSC Telecom Serbia Beograd 65.10%, Pension Reserve Fund of Republic of Srpska 9.16%, Restitution Fund of 
Republic of Srpska RS 5.03%, Zepter Fund Banja Luka 4.76%, and other shareholders 16%2
This uneven ownership structure creates complicated situation in the market of telecom operators and puts BH 
Telecom in quite undesirable and difficult position. Further, it is important to note that the Serbian government 
announces the privatization of Telecom Serbia in 2015, and the new owner would also become the majority owner 
of JSC Telekom Srpske Banja Luka. Beside ownership structure, it is important to look at basic financial indicators 
of sector’s influence and their significance. 
.
Telecommunications sector has the highest 
postwar investment in Bosna, with steady decline 
of highest level of investments in 2004 (404 
million KM 3
Further, it is important to analyze financial aspect of the three incumbent telecom operators through looking at the 
basic financial and stock exchange data from 2005 to 2013. The following table shows basic balance sheet elements 
(sales revenue, total assets, common equity and net profit - in nominal amounts and relative annual changes).
), to lowest at 2007 (166 million 
KM). To some extent coincides finalization of 
privatization of Mtel and in the last years we see 
stabilization of investments around 200 million 
annually. In addition, total sector revenue 2004-
2013 is astonishing 11.42 billion KM, which 
makes it one of the most vital sectors in the 
country. Share of the telecom sector revenue in 
the GDP of Bosnia and Herzegovina is above 5% 
threshold confirming its overall importance. Around 90% of total revenue of telecommunication sector in BiH goes to 
incumbent operators, while BH Telecom has the largest share with above 40% though last ten years.
Table 3. Revenues from sales, net income, assets and capital in (000) KM (source: compiled and processed by the authors)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BH Telecom
Sales revenue 502,884 538,162 563,538 583,223 572,206 580,406 582,610 579,270 566,800
% change - 7.02% 4.72% 3.49% -1.89% 1.43% 0.38% -0.57% -2.15%
Total assets 1,213,247 1,220,011 1,212,867 1,245,133 1,276,859 1,420,597 1,477,411 1,470,134 1,465,463
% change - 0.56% -0.59% 2.66% 2.55% 11.26% 4.00% -0.49% -0.32%
Common equity 979,086 1,021,471 1,012,524 1,019,512 1,060,154 1,090,074 1,114,289 1,099,817 1,105,119
% change - 4.33% -0.88% 0.69% 3.99% 2.82% 2.22% -1.30% 0.48%
Net profit 147,137 145,574 149,953 136,057 144,208 137,555 134,330 126,638 118,672
% change - -1.06% 3.01% -9.27% 5.99% -4.61% -2.34% -5.73% -6.29%
2 Sarajevo and Banja Luka Stock-exchanges; FBiH and RS Register of Securities, accessed 02th February 2015
3 BH currency, the Convertible Mark (Konvertabilna Marka – KM)
Table 2. Telecom sector revenues in KM
Year
Nominal GDP of 
B&H
Total revenue of 
sector1
% of 
GDP
Capital 
investment1
2004 15,998.000.000 941,229,141 5.88% 404,113,000
2005 17,148,400,000 1,075,242,000 6.27% 290,798,000
2006 19,567,000,000 1,157,470,000 5.92% 241,902,000
2007 22,065,300,000 1,216,029,000 5.51% 166,969,000
2008 24,984,100,000 1,313,030,000 5.26% 273,441,000
2009 24,307,200,000 1,300,003,000 5.35% 292,141,000
2010 24,878,700,000 1,284,619,000 5.16% 253,723,000
2011 25,772,200,000 1,276,027,000 4.95% 229,358,000
2012 25,734,300,000 1,403,456,000 5.45% 221,092,000
2013 26,282,000,000 1,391,945,476 5.30% n/a
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Mtel
Sales revenue 340,568 350,134 381,257 463,438 476,174 473,064 469,566 477,848 466,163
% change 2.03% 2.81% 8.89% 21.56% 2.75% -0.65% -0.74% 1.76% -2.45%
Total assets 811,020 800,333 784,637 1,026,882 963,888 908,681 893,631 834,610 852,531
% change 5.60% -1.32% -1.96% 30.87% -6.13% -5.73% -1.66% -6.60% 2.15%
Common equity 585,479 570,870 584,911 777,656 718,148 692,061 695,172 695,124 692,526
% change 7.21% -2.50% 2.46% 32.95% -7.65% -3.63% 0.45% -0.01% -0.37%
Net profit 80,409 77,710 71,720 119,210 102,625 108,359 107,414 109,962 100,296
% change -5.32% -3.36% -7.71% 66.22% -13.91% 5.59% -0.87% 2.37% -8.79%
Croatian Telecom
Sales revenue 95,225 122,365 236,932 243,589 236,197 238,628 216,503 261,714 247,301
% change 0.00% 28.50% 93.63% 2.81% -3.03% 1.03% -9.27% 20.88% -5.51%
Total assets 344,234 349,530 484,027 459,708 474,427 471,386 474,511 462,988 441,376
% change 0.00% 1.54% 38.48% -5.02% 3.20% -0.64% 0.66% -2.43% -4.67%
Common equity 185,617 223,843 319,269 323,348 323,222 323,442 333,366 339,612 339,692
% change 0.00% 20.59% 42.63% 1.28% -0.04% 0.07% 3.07% 1.87% 0.02%
Net profit 1,158 6,064 17,201 4,279 7,352 7,573 10,023 17,951 14,441
% change 0.00% 423.66% 183.66% -75.12% 71.82% 3.01% 32.35% 79.10% -19.55%
BH Telecom is the biggest company in the sector of telecommunications in BiH. In the year 2013, it had sales 
revenue of 567 million KM, net profit 119 million KM, total assets 1.5 billion KM and common equity in amount of 
1.1 billion KM. Mtel ranks second by size, and has sales revenue of 466 million KM, net profit 100 million KM, assets 
852 million KM and common equity in amount of 692 million KM. Croatian Telecom is on the third place with sales 
revenue of 247 million KM, net profit 14 milion KM, assets 441 million KM and common equity in amount of 340 
milion KM. BH Telecom had a certain advantage over the biggest rival Mtel in the period before 2010, but in years 
after BH Telecom faces decline in net profit relative higher than those of Mtel. The initial rise in net income for 
Croatian Telecom was primarily a result of their breakthrough in the market and a strong rise in sales, while the sudden 
decrease can be seen as market saturation and aggressive post-privatization market approach by Mtel. In 2013 net profit 
decreased for all three, BH Telecom, Mtel and Croatian Telecom, in amount of -6.29%, -8.79% and -19.55% 
respectively. By looking at nine-year period, the BH Telecom is the only one that recorded a fall in net profit of 
19.35%, while the two other telecom operators had increase in net profits. Asset growth of BH Telecom and Croatian 
Telecom is similar (20.79% and 28.22% respectively), while Croatian Telecom recorded small growth of 5.12%. BH 
Telecom achieved modest capital growth of 12.87%, Mtel of 18.28% and Croatian Telecom of 83.01%.
Based on the presented indicators one could conclude that Croatian Telecom is the most promising company 
among the observed, however it the contrary. Through analysis of indicators, that are relevant for investors, we 
reach different conclusion. Table below shows return on equity (ROE), dividends, earnings per share (EPS) and 
market price of incumbent telecom operators for the period 2005-2013. Generally, there is a noticeable difference 
between BH Telecom and Mtel on one side and the Croatian Telecom on the other.
Table 4. Overview of financial indicators (source: compiled and processed by the authors)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BH Telecom
ROE 15.03% 14.25% 14.81% 13.35% 13.60% 12.62% 12.06% 11.51% 10.74%
Dividend in KM 1.59 2.45 1.30 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 
% Retained earnings 31.43% -6.80% 44.99% 19.31% 23.87% 20.19% 18.27% 13.31% 7.49%
Market Price in KM 26.55 39.18 54.71 27.46 19.95 18.92 18.27 18.71 20.00 
Dividend yield 8.53% 5.73% 3.32% 3.16% 6.30% 8.67% 9.14% 9.47% 9.25%
EPS 2.32 2.29 2.36 2.14 2.27 2.17 2.12 2.00 1.87
P/E 9.42 8.23 10.31 8.56 8.70 8.44 8.34 8.28 8.26
Mtel
ROE 13.73% 13.61% 12.26% 15.33% 14.29% 15.66% 15.45% 15.82% 14.48%
Dividend in KM 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.20 
% Retained earnings 12.98% 35.63% 68.55% 5.03% -24.25% -4.12% 3.02% -0.01% 0.00%
Market Price in KM 1.75 2.80 2.27 0.95 1.49 1.41 1.46 1.54 1.64 
Dividend yield 10.71% 5.82% 1.64% 10.15% 27.32% 15.41% 15.04% 15.33% 13.25%
EPS 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.20
P/E 8.52 9.00 8.75 8.46 8.03 8.23 8.41 8.33 8.33
Croatian Telecom
ROE 0.62% 2.71% 5.39% 1.32% 2.27% 2.34% 3.01% 5.29% 4.25%
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Dividend in KM n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.45 0.36 
% Retained earnings n/a n/a n/a n/a 18.80% 19.96% 24.37% 20.82% 21.26%
Market Price in KM n/a n/a n/a n/a 11.50 8.80 8.73 6.40 6.50 
Dividend yield n/a n/a n/a n/a N/A 1.67% 2.73% 5.15% 5.63%
EPS 0.04 0.19 0.54 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.32 0.57 0.46
P/E n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.02 6.94 6.71 7.26 7.10
Return on equity (ROE) BH Telecom has a downward trend from 15.03% in 2005 to 10.74% in 2013, while EPS 
oscillates around 2.30 KM until 2010 when it declines to 1.87 KM in 2013. The lowest dividend was paid for 2007 
in amount of 1.30 KM, then 1.73 KM, yearly. Dividend from retained earnings was issued a in the amount of 0.93 
KM in 2006. ROE of Mtel has a slight upward trend, with 13.73% in 2005 to 14.48% in 2009. Mtel has regularly 
issued variable dividends from which the lowest was in the 2007 (0.05 KM), while the largest in 2009 (0.26 KM). 
Croatian Telecom has a modest return on equity, which has admittedly grown in the reporting period from 0.62% to 
4.25%. Croatian Telecom also has a low return on equity capital, which cannot be assessed as satisfactory. Mtel had 
EPS growth from 0.16 KM in 2005 to 0.24 in 2009, and from that point on is steady amount of 0.20 KM. For 
Croatian Telecom we also notice that EPS is indeed small but it has a rising trend. In 2005 it amounted to 0.04 KM 
while in 2013 it is 0.46% - double the size of EPS for Mtel in 2013. However, the relationship between prices and 
earnings per share (P/E) tells us that in the case of Croatian Telecom it takes 106 years to repay the investment in 
this company shares if they were bought at the end of 2009. Thus, the profitability of Croatian Telecom is simply 
insufficient given the capital employed. On the other hand, BH Telecom's and Mtel's indicators additionally confirm 
their power struggle at Bosnia telecommunications market.
Furthermore, in order to assess the intrinsic value of  three telecommunication companies, we use Franchise 
Factor Model - FFM (Leibowitz & Kogelman, 1990), which is a variation on the growth opportunities model that 
describes the relationship between a company's P/E ratio, its cost of capital, and both the size and the profitability of 
its investment opportunities. This model is suitable for assessment of growth companies and can be expressed as:
GFF
kE
P )(1
1
0  , where 
ROEk
kROEFF  represents the firm's franchise factor, or the P/E impact of the 
company's ability to  make investments that earn more than the cost of capital, and 
gk
gG

 is the present value 
growth equivalent, e.g. the present value of all future investment outlays per unit of money of asset in place.
This model emphasizes the fact that extraordinary investment quality benchmarks can be achieved only if the 
company has extraordinary investment opportunities. A P/E ratio above the base level can be achieved only if the 
firm has a unique franchise, or competitive advantage, which has two components: (1) the ability to earn above-
market returns on a given unit of money of investment, as measured by the FF, and (2) the magnitude of future 
investment opportunities, as measured by G in present value terms. In order to apply the FF model we assume that 
the weighted average cost of capital is 10%, for all companies. All companies' capital structure consists mainly of 
equity and estimation of their cost of capital could be a study for itself. Aiming to focus on companies' growth 
opportunities we assume fix cost of capital of 10% for all of them, so the base-case P/E is 10. 
Table 5. Assessment of stocks equilibrium prices (source: authors' calculations)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BH Telecom
ROE 15.03% 14.25% 14.81% 13.35% 13.60% 12.62% 12.06% 11.51% 10.74%
WACC 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Growth rate (g) 4.72% 4.81% 6.66% 2.58% 3.25% 2.55% 2.20% 1.53% 0.80%
FF 3.35 2.98 3.25 2.51 2.65 2.08 1.70 1.32 0.69
G 0.89 0.93 2.00 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.28 0.18 0.09
Base-case P/E 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
P/E 12.99 12.76 16.48 10.87 11.27 10.71 10.48 10.24 10.06
Intrinsic Value in KM 30.13 29.28 38.95 23.31 25.62 23.21 22.19 20.43 18.81 
Mtel
ROE 13.73% 13.61% 12.26% 15.33% 14.29% 15.66% 15.45% 15.82% 14.48%
WACC 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Growth rate (g) 1.78% 4.85% 8.41% 0.77% -3.47% -0.64% 0.47% 0.00% 0.00%
FF 2.72 2.65 1.84 3.48 3.00 3.61 3.53 3.68 3.10
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G 0.22 0.94 5.27 0.08 -0.26 -0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00
Base-case P/E 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
P/E 10.59 12.50 19.72 10.29 9.23 9.78 10.17 10.00 10.00
Intrinsic Value n KM 1.73 1.98 2.88 2.50 1.93 2.16 2.22 2.24 2.04 
Croatian Telecom
ROE 0.62% 2.71% 5.39% 1.32% 2.27% 2.34% 3.01% 5.29% 4.25%
WACC 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Growth rate (g) 0.62% 2.71% 5.39% 1.32% 0.43% 0.47% 0.73% 1.10% 0.90%
FF 5.00 -26.91 -8.56 -65.57 -33.96 -32.71 -23.26 -8.92 -13.52
G 0.07 0.37 1.17 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.10
Base-case P/E 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
P/E n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.48 8.40 8.16 8.90 8.66
Intrinsic Value in KM n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.97 2.01 2.59 5.06 3.96 
From Table 5 we see that Mtel and BH Telecom have a franchise, or competitive advantage. Mtel franchise 
factor has 3.10 (2013), which tells us that for every time Mtel invests (in present value terms) an amount equal to the 
book value of the existing assets, it will be able to raise its P/E ratio by 3.10. Unfortunately, Mtel's annually retained 
earnings are 0% (2013), so although Mtel has a competitive advantage it has not been exploited as a growth 
opportunity. Retained earnings are very low or even negative in period 2008-2013 (Table 4), meaning that Mtel paid 
larger dividends than annual net income in three out of six last years. This was a result of an effort of major owner 
Telecom Serbia to repay the investment made in Mtel. Finally, the Mtel's equilibrium P/E ratio according to FF 
model is just equal to its base-case P/E ratio of 10. Despite the fact that there is no additional value in this stock 
according to FF model, because the company is not using its franchise potential, the stock is yet undervalued; 
market P/E of 8.03 (as of 2013)  is less than base-case P/E of 10.
BH Telecom records a decline in franchise factor from 3.35 (2005) to 0.69 (2013). Growth equivalent was 2.00 
(in 2007) and is decreasing afterwards, to 0.09 (2013). Trends of both factors are negative, from large competitive 
advantage and growth opportunities, which resulted in an equilibrium P/E of 16.48 (2008), to an equilibrium P/E of 
10.06 (2013), almost equal to the base-case P/E. Market P/E in value of 10.69 (as of 2013) says that the BH 
Telecom stock is fairly valued to just slightly overvalued. For the third company, Croatian Telecom, we can say it is 
strongly overvalued. Its ROE does not exceed 5.40% in the analyzed period, what is much less than the cost of 
capital of 10%. Hence this company has no competitive advantage. Market P/E of 14.22 (2013) cannot be justified 
by high earnings expectations, instead is a result of stock overvaluation.
6. Consumer's perspective – a snapshot at mobile service provision
Most authors agree that various forms of network externality – especially present in telecommunications, 
significantly affect the consumers' decision to join a given network. When doing so, the consumer in fact considers a 
series of different direct and indirect network effects; from network size, offered service to social network – albeit often 
with a poor understanding of their significance or value (Karacuka et al., 2013; Zaimovic & Avdic 2014; Basaran et al.,
2014). To this end, analyses of network effects in Bosna telecommunications market was conducted with principal 
question to investigate to what extent traditional network effects play a role in consumer decision-making and loyalty 
in developing telecommunication market4
4 The research sample was 2,500 individuals covering proportionally different entities, regions, municipalities, ethnic groups, gender, as well as 
urban/rural areas in BiH. The dependent variable was the mobile carrier choice itself, while for control variables we used 15-question survey. We 
have estimate our model using multiple regression model applied to a binary dependent variable. However, the most useful outcomes are 
obtained by calculating marginal changes in the model and above presented results are appropriate values. As for the model diagnostics, both the 
Likelihood ratio as well as Wald test, for all three models reject the null hypothesis at the highest level of significance (p=0.000). We also 
preformed Hosmer-Lemeshow test which compares predicted probabilities from the model with the observed data (Long & Freese, 2006; 
Bierens, 2008) providing simple measure of fit. The results do not reject the null hypothesis at any conventional level of significance, and the 
estimated models for all three operators do fit well.
. As the overall assessment is rather extensive and is part of much broader 
research of the dynamics of telecommunication sector in BiH, for this study we have selected fey key indicators that 
best describe market relations between two biggest market competitors – the BH Telecom and Telecom Srpske. 
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The variables estimating to which extent are the service packages aligned to consumers' needs and to which 
extent a customer’s decision to change service providers is affected by the ability to keep their phone number 
without additional cost, are both significant in BH Telecom and Telecom Srpske model – but interestingly with 
different signs. In other words, ceteris paribus, consumers are less likely to select BH Telecom as their mobile 
carrier if they value service-package customization (-16%) or the ability switch carrier without additional cost while 
keeping their phone number (-8%). Contrary to BH Telecom, in Telecom Srpske model both of these variables are
positive (23% and 11% respectfully) giving Mtel a lead amongst customers who value service-package 
customization and number portability. In looking at the variables relating to consumers' social ties (in our research 
the importance of fact that the same carrier is being used by friends or colleagues from work) we again find 
significant results but with opposite signs for two biggest competitors – this time in favour for BH Telecom. Here, 
the results are negative for Telecom Srpske (-15%), while for BH Telecom is positive (9%), suggesting that the 
Mtel's business policy is clearly focused on aggressively pursuing BH Telecom consumers. On the other hand, the 
fact that these variables are positive for BH Telecom customers is to some extent confirmation of the importance of 
social ties (in this case family, friends and colleagues using the same network) in selection of this carrier and the 
success of BH Telecom policy to "hold-on" and protect its consumer's base. 
Additional confirmation of the relationship between the two direct market rival and the alignment of their 
business policies, we find in the assessment of the importance of landline service provision in the selection of 
mobile carrier. Assuming no change in the other parameters, consumers of BiH Telecom, as oppose to other two 
operators, value the link between mobile and landline carrier (15% higher probability). Having in mind that BH 
Telecom still maintains leadership position in major urban areas and business centers these results are not surprising. 
The current business strategy of exploiting the "landline link" and locking-in the customers to affordable and 
integrated service packages is working and provides additional buffer against aggressive market entry by Mtel. On 
the other hand, the negative sign for the users of Telecom Srpske can be attributed to shifting corporate policies and 
thus services offered to customers are designed without relying on existing consumer-base. The steep increase in the 
number of Mtel's mobile service users in traditionally BH Telecom area of operation, obviously confirms limitation 
to lock-in policy as well as additional confirming that Telekom Srpske has exhausted customers base in the 
territories they cover, so that their goal is make inroads into the other two operator's market. As a result, over the 
past few years, Telecom Srpske has been successful in taking over a large part of the market in the Federation of 
BiH (where BH Telecom is dominant service provider) and has the largest share of those whose choice of carrier is 
independent of which landline telephony provider they are using. 
Still, some changes are in sight. When the customers' base their operator choice on the quality of service packages 
being offered or the ability to transfer their number to different carrier, then they will have a higher probability of 
selection of Telecom Srpske (second largest carrier) or Croatian Telecom if they value new technologies. This, to some 
extent affirms, that the development of better quality customer packages will result with customers slowly losing sight 
of "territory and(or) traditionally based" carrier selection. 
7. Conclusion
As in most transition countries, in Bosnia, the liberalization process began with regulating and controlling the 
existing monopoly structure, followed by improvement and maintenance of effective competition in the context of 
imperfectly competitive market structure – in other words, using ex-ante regulation to address imbalance between 
the incumbent and alternative operators was a priority step in sector development. Regardless of all political 
difficulties, ultimately, the process was successful and today the telecommunication market is liberalized and rather 
well regulated. Market competition has shifted away from core service provision to added-value services and overall 
customer relationship management. On the other hand, the forthcoming privatization of the remaining two 
incumbent operators (BH Telecom and Croatian Telecom) is expected to bring complexity and stronger competition 
in the market - especially among the incumbent operators, which in turn will result in collateral damage of 
alternative operators. As liberalization and privatization continues the CRA should be aware that network effects 
remain an important aspect of antirust and regulatory analyses in telecommunication services as they directly 
91 Zaimović Tarik et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  195 ( 2015 )  82 – 92 
influence consumer' decisions. What we have seen from our research study is that the typical price competition is 
not perceived by the users as much important, and market dynamics rely on different set of pertinent issues. 
At the same, the core services figures have showed that overall sector development as well as the expansion of 
consumers' base is far from over. The services offered are still at rudimental level with considerable room for 
development. Financial analysis has shown that revenue for all three incumbent operators is diminishing while 
alternative telecom operators are growing and developing. In nominal terms BH Telecom is still by far the biggest 
company in the sector. Analysis of relative indicators shows that BH Telecom has certain advantage over the biggest 
rival Mtel in the period before 2010, but in years after 2010 BH Telecom faces slight decline in net profit and in
2013 Mtel had biggest ROE of 14.48%. BH Telecom follows with 10.74% and Croatian Telecom had 4.25% ROE.
Nevertheless, in both nominal and financial figures BH Telecom remains biggest company in the sector and 
although it dose faces slight decline in net profit, still remains a key market player. Our analysis of stocks' intrinsic 
value reveals that BH Telecom stock is fairly valued; Telecom Srpske (Mtel) stock is undervalued, while Croatian 
Telecom stock is strongly overvalued.
In the end – as a special addition to this overview, we have presented analyses of consumer's perspective which 
revealed both the existence of network effect in mobile market, and the strong interrelation between two market 
leaders. In all, BiH telecommunication sector is still in its expanding phase and the potential owners of state 
operators as well as entrants will have competitive and well regulated market. The future research should explore the 
role of consumers' characteristics in operators' selection as well as comprehensive and in-depth assessment of sector 
development in post-conflict environments.
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